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Abstract
This article presents an overview of the coding aspects of a GNSS receiver. Coding allows detection and correction of channel-
induced errors at the receiver, here the focus is on the mitigation of threats from malicious interferences. Although the effects
of interference at different stages of GNSS baseband processing has been deeply analyzed in the literature, little attention was
devoted to its impact on the navigation message decoding stage. The article provides an introduction to the various coding schemes
employed by current GNSS signals, discussing their performance in the presence of noise in terms of block-error rate. Additionally,
the benefits of soft-decoding schemes for navigation message decoding are highlighted when jamming interferences are present.
The proposed scheme requires estimating the noise plus interference power, yielding to enhanced decoding performances under
severe jamming conditions. Finally, cryptographic schemes as a means of providing anti-spoofing for geosecurity location-based
services, and their potential vulnerability are discussed, with particular emphasis on the dependence on the dependence of the
scheme on successful navigation message decoding.
Index Terms
bit-error rate, coding theory, Galileo, global navigation satellite systems, interference, jamming, navigation message authenti-
cation, soft-decoding, spoofing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
SECURE navigation is a feature demanded in modernGlobal Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), encompass-
ing not only reliability and integrity but also authentication of
legitimate transmission. Interference signals can cause GNSS
signal degradation, denial of service, or even counterfeit
transmissions to control the receiver positioning solution.
The effects of several types of intentional and unintentional
interferences were reported in the literature [1–10] as well as
some solutions. Mainly, these analyses were focused on the
baseband processing of GNSS receivers, where interference
countermeasures can be implemented at different stages of the
receiver including the antenna design (e.g., including enhanced
reception patterns and multi-antenna schemes [11–18, 18–
20]), radio-frequency front-end (e.g., multi-level Analogue-
to-Digital Converter (ADC) [21], adaptive quantization levels
[22], or interference detection [23]), and signal processing (e.g.
pulse blanking [24], adaptive notch filter [25]).
In contrast, the effects of interferences on the decoding
performance of the receiver have not been deeply analyzed
in the literature. This article provides a discussion on these
effects and proposes potential solutions to improve decoding
under interference. Particularly, three aspects of coding for
secure GNSS receivers are examined in this work: the coding
scheme applied to the navigation message at the satellite; the
decoding schemes employed by the receiver; and the properties
of the unreliable channel between the satellite and the user
which can be counterfeit by a malicious agent.
Although early GNSS signals carried an uncoded navigation
message, the benefits of error correcting codes for GNSS
have been recognized and all modern GNSS signals employ
forward-error correction (FEC) [26, 27].The physical channel
between the satellite and the receiver plays one of the most
important roles in defining reception performance. To date,
the performance gain introduced by the different channel code
configurations (i.e., code family, codeword length, code rate,
etc.), typically measured in terms of Frame-Error Rate (FER)
or block-error rate (BLER), are evaluated under rather benign
cases of memory-less additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channels, or dynamic channels which are characterized by
random burst errors [28]. However, BLER can be severely
degraded in the presence of interference, especially under
malicious interference or jamming.
To the best of our knowledge there is no complete char-
acterization of the signal model from the analogue received
signal down to baseband signal model at the decoder input,
for the vast variety of intentional or unintentional interference
types. Furthermore, little attention has been placed to the spe-
cific effect of interference in the decoding functionality, after
symbol demodulation. In this work, we focus on the impact of
jamming signals to channel decoding algorithms, in particular
over soft-decision decoding where the accurate estimate of
the noise plus interference power plays an important role. To
perform this analysis, the general problem of GNSS signal
demodulation and data decoding in the presence of noise and
interference is formulated and provides a general description
of the most representative GNSS channel codes together with
baseline decoding performance.
Subsequently, robust decoding is examined in Sec. III in
the context of pulsed interference. The case study assumes the
interference is strong enough to degrade the decoding relia-
bility but not sufficiently high to prevent the receiver previous
stages (i.e. baseband signal processing) to be functional. In
order words, it is assumed the receiver is able to provide
the decoder with, potentially corrupted, demodulated symbols.
The presence of the spreading sequence allows for a low com-
plexity noise plus jammer power estimation per code symbol
that significantly improves the performance of soft-decision
decoding. The considered pulsed interference model, although
it is not the only type of intentional interference, provides
a relevant model to understand the impact of interference
duration and intensity within the codeword and gain insight
on possible enhancements.
Besides robustness, the presence of coding has also con-
tributed to improvements in the integrity of the GNSS sys-
tem. Where Sec. III discusses schemes to improve decoding
reliability, regardless of the underlying data being genuine
or not, in Sec. IV the paper examines coding schemes for
anti-spoofing with an emphasis on robustness against a ma-
licious adversary who wishes to disrupt receiver operation.
The feasibility of operating such a scheme on a noisy channel
is examined, and the particular influence of the the error-
correction on the anti-spoofing schemes is assessed.
There is a rich literature regarding detection and mitigation
of spoofing signals, mainly operating at signal, observables,
or position levels of the receiver [29–36]. Complementarily,
in this section we study the benefits that coding schemes can
bring in the anti-spoofing context.
A. Signal and Threat Models
This work considers the GNSS signal in the presence of
an additive thermal noise and a malicious interference. The
received signal can be written as:
y (t) =
√
2Cd (t− τ) s (t− τ) sin (ω (t) t+ θ)
+ w (t) + j (t) , (1)
where C is the received signal power in Watts, ω and θ,
respectively denote the frequency and phase of the received
signal. The functions d and s respectively denote the symbols
of the message content, and the direct-sequence spread spec-
trum (DSSS) code-division multiple access (CDMA) spreading
2sequence. Thermal noise is modeled as an AWGN function,
w (t) which has a one-sided spectral density of N0 dBW/Hz.
The malicious interference term, j (t) can take on many
forms, but it can be modeled as a modulated carrier:
j (t) =
√
2Pj (t) sin (ωj (t) t) , (2)
where the Pj is a potentially time-varying power, for example
modeling a pulsed interference; and ωj is potentially time-
varying frequency, for example modeling a swept interference.
By choosing Pj and ωj appropriately, a broad range of
interference types can be modeled.
Here, the receiver is considered as an linear time-invariant
(LTI) system, which implements a maximum likelihood esti-
mation of the received signal. In terms of data-recovery, signal
is observed at the output of a matched filter, such that the
observation at the end of the nth symbol period is given by:
Yn =
nTs∫
(n−1)Ts
y (t) s (t− τˆ) e−i(ωˆt+θˆ)dt, (3)
where Ts represents the period of symbols of d, and the
notation xˆ represents the receiver’s local estimate of a signal
parameter x. For simplicity, this work considers that the
receiver is perfectly synchronized with the incoming signal,
such that frequency, phase and delay are perfectly matched.
One of the key features of GNSS signals which provides
resilience to interference, is the DSSS modulation, which can
provide a degree of spectral separation between relatively
narrow-band interference signals, or other signals with signif-
icantly different spectral properties. As such, the interference
contribution to Yn in (3) is often modeled as AWGN, where
the variance is determined by the spectral separation between
j (t) and s (t).
When assessing the performance of various coding and
decoding schemes it is useful to consider a number of sig-
nal quality metrics. Traditionally, GNSS signal quality is
considered in terms of the carrier power to thermal noise
spectral density ratio, C/N0, however, when dealing with the
observation, Yn, the integration period becomes important.
Three different integration periods are considered here: the
spreading symbol period, Tc; the encoded symbol period,
Ts; and the data bit period, Tb. When decoding a received
signal, these periods determine the maximum signal energy
that can be observed (signal power × observation period).
This metric, combined with the noise spectral density ratio,
typically determines the decoding error rate.
Because the interference contribution to Yn can be consid-
ered AWGN, it is convenient to consider an equivalent spectral
density denoted J0. The value of J0 is assigned based on the
average value of Pj , denoted P¯j , and the spectral separation
between j (t) and s (t), such that if an AWGN signal with a
one-sided spectral density of J0 were observed in place of j (t)
in (1), the statistics of Yn would be unchanged. This spectral
separation coefficient can be found via:
SSCs,j =
∞∫
−∞
Gs (ω)Gj (ω) dω, (4)
TABLE I
SIGNAL QUALITY METRICS FOR MESSAGE DECODING
Noise Only
Noise & Interference
Average Instantaneous
C/N0
C
N0
C
N0+J0
C
N0+J0/ρ
E/N0
CT
N0
CT
N0+J0
CT
N0+J0/ρ
SNR 2TC
N0
2TC
N0+J0
2TC
N0+J0/ρ
where Gx (ω) represents the normalized power-spectral den-
sity of x [37]. Thus, the equivalent interference noise spectral
density can be approximated by:
J0 = 2P¯jSSCs,j . (5)
Interestingly, for narrow-band interference signals, SSC can be
well approximated by the chip period, Tc, of the desired signal.
For example, when considering a continuous wave interference
and a 1.023 Mcps spreading sequence, then SSCs,j ≈ −60 dB.
The rationale for considering the average power in (5) is
that the interference may be observed intermittently by the
receiver. For example, many interference sources take the form
of continuous wave signal which is swept rapidly across a
wide frequency range, exceeding the receive bandwidth of
the affected receiver. From the perspective of the receiver the
interference is intermittently present. Similarly, an interference
source may remain within the bandwidth of a receiver, but may
exhibit a pulsed amplitude modulation. When the interference
repetition period is short with respect to Ts, the net effect is
that of a continuously visible interference of reduced power.
Specifically, if the interference signal is visible to a receiver
for a fraction, ρ, of the time, then P¯j = ρPj , and the equivalent
average one-sided spectral density of the AWGN experienced
by the receiver is given by: N0 + J0. In this case ρ might
be equal to the duty cycle of a pulsed interference, or the
fraction of time a swept interference remains in-band. In the
work that follows, it is assumed that J0 can be found for a
given interference signal via (4) and (5).
In contrast, when the received signal is observed over a
period which is very short relative to the pulse or sweep period,
then the instantaneous equivalent AWGN spectral density
must be considered, which is given by N0 in the absence of
interference, and by N0 + J0/ρ in its presence. Considering
the above, a number of useful signal quality metrics can be
defined, for a given observation period, T .
These various definitions are presented in Tab. I which links
the average and instantaneous values of the C/N0, E/N0, and
SNR both in the presence and absence of pulsed interference.
The period, T , can represent any of Tc, Ts or Tb.
II. CODING SCHEMES FOR GNSS
Like other wireless communication signals, navigation sig-
nals are subject to noise, multipath and shadowing effects
which may induce errors in the received data. Modern nav-
igation signals employ some techniques to detect and correct
these errors. Generally speaking, error correction may be real-
ized in two different ways. The first is called automatic repeat
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CODING SCHEMES USED IN GNSS SIGNALS
System Signal Message Coding
GPS L1 C/A LNAV none
L1C CNAV-2 block: BCH & LDPC
L2C CNAV ½-rate convolutional
L5 CNAV ½-rate convolutional
Galileo E1-B INAV ½-rate convolutional
E6-B CNAV ½-rate convolutional
E5a FNAV ½-rate convolutional
E5b INAV ½-rate convolutional
SBAS L1 SBAS ½-rate convolutional
request (ARQ), sometimes also referred to as backward error
correction, whereby every block of data received is checked
using an error detection code: if the check fails, retransmission
of the data is requested. However, since navigation systems
are one-way, or simplex, systems FEC techniques are used,
whereby the sender encodes the data using an error-correcting
code prior to transmission. The additional information added
by the code, called also redundancy, is used by the receiver to
recover the original data.
Galileo, modernized GPS as well as space-based augmen-
tation systems (SBAS) (e.g. WAAS, EGNOS) messages make
use of FEC. In the following the various error protection
techniques used by these systems are described and some
details are given for the encoding and decoding processes.
The fundamental principle of channel coding is to add
redundancy to the navigation message, which is used by a
receiver to detect or correct possible errors in the received
symbols. The redundant bits added by the encoder are a
function of the original information. The original bits may
or may not be directly visible in the encoded message. In the
first case the encoding is called systematic while in the second
case it is called non-systematic.
Channel coding techniques can be further divided into block
codes and convolutional codes. Block codes operate on fixed-
sized blocks of data, each of which are encoded separately,
while convolution codes operate on a continuous stream of
input data. Both kinds of codes are employed in GNSS, a few
of which are detailed in Table II.
A. Convolutional Codes
Binary, 1/r-rate, convolutional encoding, as used in GNSS,
can be considered as a discrete-time, single-input, r-output
finite impulse response (FIR) LTI system operating over the fi-
nite field, F2. Particular encoding schemes can be parametrized
by the following: encoding rate, r, denoting the number of
output bits generated for each input bit; the set of r impulse
responses, Gi; the constraint length, L, equal to the length of
the longest impulse response.
The encoder operates by convolving the input se-
quence with each of the r impulse responses, Gi =
{gi (0) , gi (1) , ..., gi (L− 1)}, to produce r binary sequences.
Basic 1/r-rate encoders interleave the bits of these r sequences
to form one output stream. Similar, k/r-rate codes, often
referred to as punctured or perforated codes, can be generated
from their corresponding 1/r encoder by applying a punc-
turing matrix, which implements a deterministic omission of
Fig. 1. A block diagram of the 1/2-rate, convolutional encoder with a
constraint length of 7, as used by Galileo having G1=171o and G2=133o.
certain output bits [38]. As an example, Fig. 1 depicts the
convolutional encoder used by Galileo, where z−1 denotes a
unit delay.
At the receiver, the most common method of parsing the re-
ceived symbols is via the use of a Viterbi decoder [39], which
offers near-optimal decoding in many cases [40]. This dynamic
programming technique finds the most likely sequence of
original navigation bits in the sequence of received symbols. It
operates by examining the difference between each received
symbol and all possible symbols in the alphabet, known as
the branch metric, summed across the sequence of received
symbols, known as the path metric. The most likely sequence
of transmitted bits is that which corresponds to the lowest path
metric. Implementations of the decoder can differ in how the
branch metric is computed, and can implement hard-decoding,
where the branch metric is computed as the Hamming-distance
between received symbols and symbols in the alphabet; or as
soft-decoding, where each received symbol may be ascribed a
certain weighting when computing the branch metric.
The coding operation can be applied to a continuous stream
of bits, or can be applied block-wise. Galileo, for example,
applies the coding block-wise, wherein each page of the
navigation message is encoded separately. In this way the
initial state of the encoder is always ‘000000’, moreover, a
specific set of tail bits are included to force the encoder to
return to this state at the end of each block. Each block is
separated by a predefined synchronization word to identify
the beginning of each encoded page. In contrast, the encoding
of the CNAV message on L2C and L5, as well as EGNOS
and WAAS, is done as a continuous stream.
B. BCH Codes
As different parts of a GNSS message may have different
importance, or may need to be extracted in isolation from other
parts of the message, it can be valuable to implement a separate
encoding of certain sequences of bits. In the case of GPS L1C,
the CNAV-2 message will employ a separate encoding scheme
on one of its subframes, containing the time-of-interval (TOI)
counter, a parameter that a receiver may require to access
rapidly and reliably.
A cyclic error correcting code, known as a Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem (BCH) code is used in a configuration which
provides very high redundancy and, thereby, very high error-
correction capability. Specifically, a BCH(51,9) encoding is
used, which produces 51 output symbols for every 9 data
bits. Exact encoding and decoding procedure can be found, for
example, in [41]. One simple implementation of the encoder
is that of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), as depicted
in Fig. 2.
4Fig. 2. An example shift-register implementation of a BCH encoder for the
polynomial: 1 + x+ x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8.
Although many algorithms exist for BCH decoding, due to
the extremely high redundancy of this particular implementa-
tion, it is relatively easy for a receiver to simply implement
a brute-force check of all 29 = 512 possible messages,
comparing the locally generated codeword against that which
is received. The comparison may be implemented as a hard-
decoding, taking the Hamming-distance between generated
and received symbols, or may implement soft-decoding and
effect a maximum-likelihood (ML) decoder.
C. LDPC Codes
Binary low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes are a class
of systematic, linear error-correcting codes defined as the null
space of a binary (n − k) × n parity-check matrix H, where
k and n indicate the length of the information part and of the
codeword respectively [42]. With a low density parity check
matrix, H, these codes can achieve spectral efficiencies close
to that of the channel capacity [43, 44]. Regular LDPC codes
are characterized by a parity-check matrix, where columns and
rows exhibit constant Hamming weights and equal density,
while irregular LDPC codes, which exhibit slightly better
performance, have non-constant column and row Hamming
weights [44, 45]. An irregular LDPC code has been employed
for the GPS L1C signal for all of the navigation data, other
than the TOI [41].
Central to the definition of a particular LDPC code is the
parity check matrix, H. Details of the GPS L1C, for example,
can be found in [41].
Typically, however, the matrix is constructed from a set
of sub-matrices, [41, 44] as shown in (6). Note that the
dimensions of the matrix H are specific to the length of
the data to be encoded. For the GPS L1C message, two H
matrices are defined, one for the second subframe, having
dimension 600 × 1200, and another for the third subframe,
having dimensions 274 × 548. Both versions of the LDPC
codes produce a coding rate of 1/2.
H =

A B T
C D E
 (6)
The encoded message contains systematic portion, containing
the original data bits u, and two parity check portions p1 and
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 510
−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Eb/N0 (dB Hz)
B
LE
R
 
 
GNSS/SBAS CC
GPS L1C LDPC
GPS L1C BCH
Fig. 3. Performance of channel codes used in GNSS/SBAS systems in terms
of BLER vs Eb/N0.
p2, which are obtained as follows:
φ = −ET−1B+D
p1
t = −φ−1 (−ET−1A+C)ut
p2
t = −T−1 (Aut +Bp1t)
c = [u p1 p2] (7)
Decoding techniques are generally iterative and based on
graphs algorithms and include, for example: the sum-product
algorithm for general graph-based codes; maximum a posteri-
ori probability (MAP) algorithms for trellis graph-based codes;
the message passing algorithm for bipartite graph-based codes
[42–44].
D. Performance in AWGN
To provide some context to the following sections, a brief
Monte-Carlo simulation based performance evaluation of the
three coding schemes is presented here. Error correction
performance in the AWGN channel is provided in terms of
BLER, where an entire block of decoded data is considered
incorrect entirely if one or more bits are incorrect. In practical
schemes, this is generally determined by examining the cyclic
redundancy check (CRC). Recovery of the symbols can be
performed in a number of ways, for example by examining
the sign of the in-phase correlator channel, < (Yn), or via
comparison of the data and pilot components of the composite
signal, examining the sign of their dot-product,
(
Y Dn · Y Pn
)
,
where the superscripts D and P denote the data and pilot
signal components, respectively. The first case requires that the
receiver maintains phase-lock on the signal in order to perform
data demodulation, while the second does not, and can provide
data demodulation in the presence of high receiver dynamics
or when the received signal is too weak to allow reliable phase
tracking. Interestingly, when a long coherent integration period
is applied to the pilot signal component, the demodulation
performance of the second case converges to that of the first,
despite the relaxed tracking requirement. For simplicity, in the
analysis that follows it is assumed receiver is synchronized
with the received signal and that the presence of thermal noise
and interference only influences the data recovery.
Results are presented in two forms: in terms of energy-per-
bit, Eb/N0, and in terms of carrier power, C/N0. Expressing
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Fig. 4. Performance of channel codes used in GNSS/SBAS systems in terms
of BLER vs C/N0.
TABLE III
DEMODULATION THRESHOLDS FOR GNSS/SBAS
FEC Scheme Required for BLER = 10
−3
Eb/N0 (dB) C/N0 (dB-Hz)
GNSS/SBAS CC 4.31 21.30
GPS L1C LDPC 1.85 18.84
GPS L1C BCH 3.95 16.33
performance in terms of Eb/N0 provides some insight into
the benefits, or coding gain, provided by a specific technique,
without considering the coding rate; while expressing per-
formance in terms of C/N0 provides some more practical
insight into the effective signal strength that might be required
to attain useful receiver performance, not considering the
efficiency of the coding scheme.
Results presented in Fig. 3 and 4 show the performance of
the convolutional codes used by GPS, Galileo, EGNOS and
WAAS against that of the BCH and LDPC codes used by
the GPS L1C signal. To provide a fair comparison between
LDPC and convolutional codes, a block length of 600 bits
was considered, corresponding to one subframe of the GPS
L1C signal.
The improved performance of the LDPC code is apparent
in Fig. 3, providing a coding gain of approximately 2.5 dB
with respect to the convolutional codes. For lower Eb/N0
conditions, the BCH codes curve is the lowest BLER. How-
ever, for higher Eb/N0 conditions, this margin reduces and
ultimately the coding gain reduces to below that of the LDPC
codes, suggesting that the benefits provided by the higher
redundancy are, perhaps, limited by the shortness of the code.
Thus rather than an assessment of the BCH performance itself,
the curve characterizes the performance for this very specific
design choice, where the protection of a very short message,
of 9 bits, was required. Nonetheless, examining Fig. 4, the
benefits of the BCH encoding of the GPS TOI are immediately
apparent, providing reliably decoding to very low C/N0 levels.
Examining these figures it is possible to find approximate
thresholds for a given demodulation BLER, of which those
corresponding to a BLER of 10−3 are presented in Tab. III.
III. RECEIVER ALGORITHMS FOR MESSAGE DECODING
UNDER JAMMING
In this section we deal with the effect of jamming on
the receiver message decoding, after tracking and symbol
demodulation is performed. While it is in general difficult to
identify the worst-case jamming signal for a given communi-
cation system, in the following we assume a generalized pulse
jamming for several reasons. Firstly, it is general enough to
include both pulse jamming as well as CW and additive noise
jamming. Secondly, the generalized pulse jamming, which
is detailed below, is not periodic and is therefore hardly
predictable at the receiver. For these reasons, pulse jamming
is often applied to assess the robustness of a communication
system [46–48].
In more general terms, if one is free to design a communi-
cation system for maximum robustness against jamming, the
worst-case jammer will be AWGN [49]. This is not the case
for the GNSS systems considered here and we also would
like to stress that any countermeasure against jamming which
exploits features of channel coding naturally only can work if
the jamming power is below a level which would affect the
analog hardware, like e.g. driving amplifiers or the ADC into
saturation or even destroy circuits.
When evaluating coding performance it is common to
provide Bit-Error Rate (BER), BLER results for the AWGN
channel with antipodal modulation, as we have provided in
the previous section. However, in the presence of intentional
interference or jamming such reference performance curves
can be severely degraded. See for instance [50], where this
evaluation is carried out for Deep-Space telecommand com-
munication links. Although there are differences in the specific
error correcting codes and the spreading involved, it provides
a good analysis to understand the degradation the system
may suffer in the presence of jamming and how it can be
mitigated. In general terms: soft-decision decoding helps and
strong codes, such as turbo codes and LPDC codes provide
stronger protection. In [51] soft decision decoding is also
proposed as an enhanced decoding approach in the presence
of jamming where different estimators for the calculation of
soft-input values are analyzed.
When evaluating anti-jamming capabilities of GNSS signals
from a coding perspective we can distinguish two important
coding components: first, the presence of a spreading sequence
in the GNSS signal, which can be intepreted as a repetion
code; second, the specific error correction code used by the
different GNSS signal during encoding, as described in the
previous section.
With respect to the former all spreading sequences used
in GNSS systems share a common feature: they are pseudo-
random sequences. These sequences are generated in various
ways depending on the type of GNSS signal [52] including
maximal-length sequences, Gold codes, memory codes, and
Weil codes. In the following it will be shown that the most
significant parameter in terms of anti-jamming capabilities is
the sequence length.
With respect to the error correcting code the decoding
performance greatly depends on the specific code selection
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Fig. 5. Block diagram of a coded spread spectrum system.
and corresponding decoding algorithm. However, they have in
common that most soft-decision decoding algorithms require
the knowledge of the noise variance affecting each bit in the
codeword. We shall remark that there are decoding algorithms
like the max-log for LPDC decoding that do not explicitly
requires the noise variance estimate, provided all coded bits
are affected by the same noise variance. Otherwise decoding
performance degrades. This is also the case of the Viterbi
algorithm, where a normalization factor does not affect perfor-
mance under the same previous assumptions. In the following,
we show how the the spreading sequence can help on the
estimation of the (equivalent) noise variance.
A. System Model
A simplified block diagram for the transmission and re-
ception of the GNSS message is depicted in Fig. 5. The
message is first encoded by one of the codes described in
Sec. II, then the encoded bits are mapped to BPSK symbols
and each symbol is multiplied by the spreading sequence. The
receiver performs roughly the inverse steps in order to recover
the original message. In this section, we will focus on the
despreading operation and make use of soft decoding which
operates on the probabilities of the coded bits.
1) Transmitter: At the transmitter, i.e. in the space seg-
ment, we represent the message as a binary vector u =
[u0, u1, . . . , uK−1] of K bits. This message is encoded into
a codeword c =
[
c0, c1, . . . , cNc−1
]
of length Nc > K
and mapped to BPSK symbols dn = µ (cn) ∈ {−1, 1},
where we apply µ(0) = 1 and µ(1) = −1. Denoting the
spreading sequence by s =
[
s0, s1, . . . , sNs−1
] ∈ {−1, 1}Ns ,
the transmitted symbols in base-band, also denoted as chips,
are given by xn,m = dnsm, with n = 0, 1, . . . , Nc − 1 and
m = 0, 1, . . . , Ns−1. The transmitted chip sequence per coded
bit is therefore given by
xn = dn · s = [xn,0, xn,1, . . . , xn,Ns−1] , n = 0, . . . , Nc − 1
and the number of chips per codeword is hence NcNs.
2) Channel and Interference Model: Among the different
types of interference introduced in Sec. I-A, we focus on
periodic pulsed interference, which is a representative case
for the study of the impact of interference signal in terms
of assessing the receiver decoding performance when the
interference is highly uncorrelated with the actual transmitted
signal.
In particular, we model the channel as the real-valued
AWGN channel with noise variance, while we assume that
the interference transmits impulses of length Np chips with
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Fig. 6. Example interference impulses in relation to bit sequence.
probability ρ. This is a generalization of the periodic pulse
interference with duty cycle ρ. Note that in general the
interference pulses may not appear in regular intervals but
can be randomly spaced which makes it hardly impossible
for the receiver to detect the pulse length and periodicity of
the interference. Hence, for the evaluation of the decoding
performance, the interference signal is generated such that
for each bit interval an interference pulse is generated with
probability ρ while the average power over the entire codeword
is fixed.
With these assumptions, the received symbol sequence
which corresponds to the coded bit cn is given by
yn = dn · s+wn, yn,m = dnsm + wn,m (8)
where the noise is normal distributed with wn,m ∼
N (0, σ2n,m) and
σ2n,m =
{
N0
2Tc
for clean chips
N0
2Tc
+ J02ρTc for jammed chips
(9)
An illustrative example of the interference realization is
shown in Fig. 6 where the interference, additive noise and data
signal are depicted for the first chip samples of the transmit-
ted codeword. The vertical discontinuous lines separate each
coded symbol. In the example the pulsed interference duration
is less than a symbol period, with some symbols affected with
several interference pulses and others where the interference
is not present at all.
B. Soft Despreading
The task of the despreading circuit at the receiver is to
obtain the posterior probability of each bit, given the observed
sequence yn. An equivalent metric is the log-likelihood ratio
(LLR), which is defined as:
LLRn , ln
P [cn = 0 | yn]
P [cn = 1 | yn] = ln
p (yn | dn = 1)
p (yn | dn = −1)
=
Ns−1∑
m=0
ln
p (yn,m | dn = 1)
p (yn,m | dn = −1) =
Ns−1∑
m=0
2sm
σ2n,m
yn,m
(10)
Note that this expression depends on the noise variance
per chip which requires knowledge of the noise and jamming
7power per chip. This means that not only the jamming power
but also the positions of the jamming impulses are required
to compute the exact LLRs. Since in particular, we cannot
assume the latter, we have to resort to a simpler metric.
In the case that all chips of the sequence yn are affected
by the same jamming pulse, we can express the noise and
jamming power by the single parameter σ2n and the expression
for the LLR simplifies to
LLRn =
2
σ2n
Ns−1∑
m=0
smyn,m =
2
σ2n
syTn (11)
1) Estimation of Jamming and Noise Power: Assuming a
fixed noise variance per bit, the conditional pdf of the received
sequence is
p
(
yn | dn, σ2n
)
=
(
1√
2piσ2n
)Ns
exp
(
−‖yn − dns‖
2
2σ2n
)
and the corresponding negative log-likelihood function
L (dn, σ2n) , − ln p (yn | dn, σ2n)
=
Ns
2
ln
(
2piσ2n
)
+
‖yn − dns‖2
2σ2n
(12)
which has the extremal points
∂L (dn, σ2n)
∂d
= 0 ⇒ dˆn = sy
T
n
Ns
∂L (dn, σ2n)
∂σ2n
= 0 ⇒ σˆ2n =
1
Ns
∥∥∥yn − dˆns∥∥∥2
Notice that the product syTn corresponds to the de-spreading
operation and thus dˆn is precisely the prompt sample at the
output of the correlators. This finally leads to the estimate of
the noise and jamming power per bit, given by
σˆ2n =
1
Ns
∥∥∥∥yn − syTnNs s
∥∥∥∥2 (13)
As a reference to other receiver decoding schemes, we may
consider:
1) hard despreading followed by hard-input Viterbi decod-
ing,
cˆn =
{
1 if syTn < 0
0 otherwise
(14)
2) soft despreading with knowlegde of noise power only
(this may represent the case where the background noise
power is estimated - maybe on a different time-scale
than per codeword - but the receiver is not aware of the
interference)
LLR(1)n =
4
N0
syTn (15)
3) soft despreading with estimated noise and jamming
power (the receiver observes the jamming power uni-
formly distributed over the codeword, although the ac-
tual jammer is not):
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Fig. 7. BLER with interference for soft and hard decoding with ρ = 1.
LLR(2)n =
2
σˆ2n
syTn (16)
4) soft despreading with knowledge of jamming power and
positions (as a genie bound):
LLR(3)n =
Ns−1∑
m=0
2sm
σ2n,m
yn,m (17)
5) soft despreading with no knowledge of signal to noise
ratio (blind decoder):
LLR(5)n = sy
T
n (18)
C. Simulation Results
This section provides BLER and BER performance results
for a reference scenario based on Galileo E1-B signal. For its
GPS counterpart, L1 C/A (this signal implements no channel
coding) simulation results are indicative of the performance
degradation for different interference realizations.
The parameters used for the numerical assessment are
specified in Table IV. Since the focus of this section is on
interference impact on the decoding functionality we assume
perfect synchronization and signal demodulation. In both
scenarios the channel is generated according to (8) where the
additive noise and interference samples are generated from
two independent zero-mean normal distributions such that (9)
is met.
Fig. 7 illustrates the performance gain of soft decoding
versus hard decoding with LLR values for soft decoding
computed as in (16) and (13). Taking as baseline a continuous
interference with ρ = 1, this is equivalent to raising the
noise power. In the example, the E1-B signal is decoded
with the Viterbi algorithm after de-spreading the received
signal according to LLR(1)n , LLR
(2)
n , LLR
(3)
n , LLR
(4)
n and
LLR(5)n , respectively. Simulations are carried out for a fixed
signal to noise ratio Ec/N0 = −10 dB (corresponding to a
C/N0 = 50 dB/Hz) and variable Ec/J0. As expected, when
all coded symbols in a codeword are affected by the same noise
variance, as it is the case when the interference is continuous
8TABLE IV
CODING AND SPREADING SCHEMES FOR REFERENCE SCENARIOS
Simulation parameters System & Signal
L1 C/A Galileo E1-B
Coding None 1/2-rate conv.
Message length 300 bits 114 bits + 6 tail bits
Codeword length 300 coded symbols 240 coded symbols
Spreading sequence 1023 Gold-code, repeated 20 times 4092 random
Spreading gain 20460 chips 4092 chips
Chip rate 1.023 Mcps 1.023 Mcps
Symbol rate 50 sps 250 sps
Pulsed interference duration Np = 1%, 10%,100% and 200% symbol duration Np = 1%, 10%,100% and 200% symbol duration
Np = 204, 2046, 20460 and 4092 chips Np = 40,409,4092 and 8184 chips
or has the same pulse length of a codeword, the Viterbi decoder
is transparent to a scalar mismatch in the log-likelihood values.
Hence, for all soft decoding realizations the BLER is the same
with approximately 2 dB gain in terms of Ec/J0 with respect
to hard decoding, clearly showing the increase in robustness
achieved with soft-decoding.
If we allow the interference to have lower duty-cycle then
the decoding performance strongly depends on the knowledge
of noise plus interference power at each coded symbol. This
effect is clearly observed in Fig. 8 where the BLER at
Ec/N0 = −10 dB is depicted for ρ = 0.1 and different
pulse lengths. The pulse length is set to a percentage of the
symbol duration, with the assumption that it corresponds to
an integer number of chips. For the reference signal E1-B the
interference pulse duration takes values Np = 40, 409, 4092,
and 8184 chips in the different simulation realizations. Note
that the number of interference pulses in a codeword depends
on the value of ρ and Np. That is, for the same interference
power, and duty cycle ρ, the longer the pulse duration the less
number of interference pulses are present in a codeword. The
opposite occurs when the pulse length is reduced. In this case
the number of symbols affected by interference increases. At
each Monte-Carlo realization a single codeword is transmitted,
with interference pulses positions being randomly generated.
Simulation results in Fig. 8 lead to the conclusion that
having an estimate of the noise plus interference power always
improves the decoder performance, even though the estimate
is obtained at symbol level without actual knowledge of
the pulsed interference position with chip granularity. While
completely ignoring the presence of the interference may
even result in worst performance than hard decoding, as it
is apparent in the case of a interference affecting an entire
symbol Fig. 8 (c) and (d). Similar results are obtained for
other values of the duty cycle. Back to the E1-B signal, an
example of the noise variance estimate compared to the actual
noise + interference variance is depicted in Fig. 9 for two
different values of pulsed interference length. Intuitively, for
increasing values of Np the assumption made in (10) is more
plausible and thus the results are closer to the optimal solution
in (11).
It is important to remark that the gains of the proposed
scheme against interference is practically independent of the
actual spreading sequence. The differences are in the spreading
gain, namely the spreading sequence length.
To conclude this section, we shall remark the significant
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Fig. 9. Example of noise variance estimate for a pulsed interference with
ρ = 0.1, Np = 409 and Ec/J0 = −37 dB
gains this simple, low complexity, noise plus interference
variance estimator, resulting in LLR(2)n , applied with soft
channel decoding brings to GNSS interference environments.
The estimator is aware of the presence of interference power
but lacking the knowledge of where it appears.
IV. CODING SCHEMES FOR ANTI-SPOOFING
The coding schemes presented so far have focused on
the correct extraction of a data sequence from a noise- or
interference-corrupted set of received symbols. This process
has been based upon the assumption that the underlying data
is present, and is genuine. The coding schemes have sought
only to discern the most likely value of the data sequence. In
contrast, this section will examine the problem of determining
whether or not a given data sequence, once extracted from
the noise, is genuine and has originated at a GNSS satellite,
or is counterfeit, and may have originated from a malicious
transmitter.
Unfortunately, the need for secure GNSS for civilian users
was not anticipated when current GNSSs were designed, and
so a wide range of ad-hoc solutions have been proposed to
satisfy this need without requiring changes to the satellite sys-
tems. These schemes have typically exploited the high entropy
military GNSS signals, and observe them simultaneously from
two locations, between which there is a trusted communication
infrastructure. Although the concept is over two decades old
[53, 54] it is a popular approach [55, 56]. In this case, the
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Fig. 8. BLER for E1-B in the presence of pulsed interference with ρ = 0.1 and Ec/N0 = −10 dB.
security of one receiver is dependent upon the assumption that
the other is secure, although this can be addressed via the use
of an authorized receiver [57, 58].
In terms of system evolution there have been many pro-
posals for schemes which can provide robust anti-spoofing,
which can be categorized as either signal- or message-based.
The signal-based variety generally aim to make the process
described above more secure or more efficient [59–61], while
the message based schemes typically introduce more classical
cryptographic operations to the navigation message processing
[60–65], as will be discussed further below.
A. Requirements for Secure Navigation
The vulnerability of a typical GNSS user stems from a vari-
ety of assumptions regarding the observed GNSS signal and its
relation to physical space and time. A position computed by a
naı¨ve GNSS user makes two distinct assumptions which lead
to its vulnerability: firstly, it is assumed that the data broadcast
by the satellite and, subsequently used in the computation of
a position, velocity and time solution (PVT), is genuine and,
secondly, it is assumed that the observed time-of-arrival of
the signal is strictly related to the geometric range between
the user and the satellite. If either one of these assumptions
are invalidated then so too is the associated PVT. An adversary
might attempt to manipulate the PVT by preying on either or
both the observed signal latency, termed the pseudorange, and
its message content.
A user may wish to assure that the computed PVT is
genuine, in the sense that its error is associated with non-
malicious factors, such as thermal noise signal-in-space errors
and local propagation effects, rather than from intentional
manipulation of the received signal by an adversary. To achieve
this, two factors must be secured: the message content and the
signal path.
The signal content encompasses the information payload
of the signal, in a pure communication sense. In this
case it includes information such as time-of-week, satellite
ephemerides, clock corrections, atmospheric correction, satel-
lite health and almanac data, etc. To ensure that the user can
trust that satellite position and transmit-times gleaned from
this data are genuine and correct, then the integrity of the
data must be ensured. In a cryptographic sense, assuring data
integrity is to assure the accuracy and consistency of the data,
for which a large selection well established schemes exist.
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The signal path encompasses the propagation of the signal
from the satellite to the user. In essence, time-of-arrival
ranging is a channel estimation problem, whereby the length
of the channel between the satellite and the user is measured
via the broadcast GNSS signals. The user should be able to
trust that the time-of-flight of the signal across this path is
strictly related to the geometric range between the satellite
and the user.
If a signal path to the user were to be described by the
sequence of points: p0, p1, ..., pN−1, pN , where p0 is the point
of origin of the signal, and pN is the position of the user,
then nominal navigation assumes that p0 is the satellite and
N = 1. If a malicious adversary generates counterfeit signals
and broadcasts them to the user, then p0 is the adversary again,
N = 1. Alternatively, if this adversary intercepts genuine
satellite signals, and manipulates them before rebroadcast to
the user, then p0 is the satellite, p1 is the adversary, and
N = 2. A receiver may trust a PVT when a strict relationship
between geometric range and signal path is ensured, which
occurs when: p0 is the satellite position, and N = 1.
The first condition, that p0 corresponds to the satellite
position can be addressed as a problem of signal authenticity
or data origin authentication. To ensure that the signal has
originated from the system, via the satellite, it should contain
some component which is infeasible for a malicious adversary
to independently generate, but practical for a user to verify.
Note that this requirement also implies that the signal be non-
repeating: having intercepted one signal period, it should not
be possible to readily replicate signals not yet broadcast. Being
a classic cryptography problem many appropriate schemes
exist which can be directly applied in this case [60–64, 66, 67].
The second condition, that N = 1, stipulates that the signal
time-of-flight is entirely attributable to geometric range. This
condition precludes the relaying of signals, received at one or
more locations, towards a target receiver. Although there are
many means by which a signal can be rendered difficult to
manipulate and relay, unfortunately, given the constraints of
the broadcast-only system, there appears to be no convenient
coding-level means by which this condition can be rendered
enforced to the same degree as the first.
Therefore, this section will focus only on the problem of
ensuring that a user can readily assert that p0 is the satellite.
Facility for a user to verify this might be provided in the form
of a navigation message authentication (NMA) scheme. Such a
scheme may insert cryptographic content into available space
in the signals navigation message which can be exploited by a
user to verify the authenticity of the navigation message and
to verify that it originated at the satellite.
B. Digital Signatures
The digital signature forms the basic building block of
navigation message authentication schemes either by providing
the NMA itself, or by facilitating other message authentication
schemes, as discussed in Sec. IV-C. The purpose of a digital
signature is to provide a means of guaranteeing who generated
a given message and is a mechanism that relies on public-key
cryptography. The basic principle is that a one party uses a
private key to generate a signature for a given message, and a
second party can use the corresponding public key to verify the
signature. Verification of the signature provides both message
integrity and data origin authentication.
When applied directly to the problem navigation message
authentication, the signature is generated as a function of both
the navigation data bits that are to be signed, and of the private
key. Many well known signature schemes exist, for example
RSA, DSA, ECDSA [64, 66, 67].
The system generates a public-private key pair:
{Kpriv,Kpub}, and shares Kpub with the intended users.
For a given block of navigation data, u, a signature is
generated as s = S (Kpriv,u). If a GNSS signal were to
employ a digital signature based NMA, then both u and
s would be encoded to c and broadcast in the navigation
message. At the receiver, the symbols would be recovered,
decoded, and a verification operation would be conducted:
V (Kpub,d, s) = true/false. Generally it is desirable to
include some additional, frequently-changing data in the
signature generation, to ensure that, even when the navigation
data is repeating, successive signatures are different. Inclusion
of the time-of-week, for example, can serve this purpose.
It is important to note that the verification operation relies
on the correct recovery of the data and signature in their
entirety. This places an additional burden on the receiver,
over what is required for typical navigation applications.
Under benign conditions, a receiver need only sporadically
retrieve the navigation data, as ephemeris parameters have
a long validity. To avail of trustworthy navigation, however,
the receiver must maintain continuous data retrieval, as will
be discussed in Sec. IV-D. This is especially critical for
digital-signature based NMA, as public key cryptography is
relatively inefficient. When considering ECDSA, to achieve B-
bit security, (implying that a brute-force attack would require
2B trials), a public key of 2B bits must be used, and will
require a signature of 4B bits [66]. This fact is a motivator
for the use of symmetric cryptographic schemes, where the
relationship between key-size, signature and security is closer
to unity.
C. Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code (MAC) can be considered as
a compact, cryptographically-secure fingerprint of a piece of
data, and can offer an efficient way of verifying its authenticity.
Many standard implementation exist, popular amongst them
being the keyed-hash MAC, or HMAC, which is implemented
using a cryptographic hash function. Such a hash function,
h (·), operates on arbitrary length data streams, to producing a
finite output, which is highly sensitive to changes in the input
data.
If a GNSS signal were to employ a MAC-based NMA, then
a symmetric key, ki would be used to generate a MAC mi
as: mi = h (u, ki) and both u and mi would be encoded to
navigation symbols and broadcast in the navigation message.
At the receiver, the symbols would be recovered, decoded,
and a verification operation would be conducted to assert
that h (u, ki) is equal to the received mi. As h (·) preimage-
resistant, or difficult to invert, even with knowledge of mi and
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u, the value of ki cannot be determined, thus only a holder
of ki can generate a valid mi. In the event that the system
releases ki only after u and mi have been received by the
user, then message authentication can be achieved.
A scheme known as TESLA provides this functionality
[60–62], whereby message authentication codes are generated
using a special series of symmetric keys, generated via:
ki = h
N−i (k0) , 0 < i ≤ N, (19)
which defines a hash-chain, of length N . Once the root value
k0 has been shared between the system and the user, the
authenticity of a ki can be asserted via (19). NMA can then be
achieved by broadcasting, in sequence, the values mi then u
and then ki. A user will first verify ki and then use it to verify
mi, thereby authenticating the origin of u. Noting that N can
be quite large, the remaining problem of securely sharing k0
can be solved via the use of digital signatures, as described in
Sec. IV-B, and broadcast only very rarely.
Such a scheme has a number of advantages over digital
signatures. Firstly, the total data occupancy of mi and ki
will be approximately half that of an ECDSA signature of
equivalent security. Secondly, while a complete recovery of
the signature is required for digital signatures, a user may
decide to accept only a partial match in the verification of mi,
with the associated reduction in security, but gaining tolerance
to a few bit errors.
D. Denial Of Service
For users who might avail of a GNSS NMA service,
the concept of denial-of-service (DOS) can be reconsidered.
Generally, DOS is considered to be the denial of the use of
the GNSS signals for navigation purposes, typically performed
by overwhelming the target receiver with an interference, such
that the navigation signals may not be acquired or tracked. In
such cases, it might be quite often obvious to the user that
they the subject of a malicious attack. In fact, under certain
circumstances, if the interference is sufficiently powerful, it is
even possible to localize its source.
Considering an NMA user, if it is only necessary to disrupt
the message authentication process, DOS might be achieved
my simply ensuring that the message content, s or {mi, ki}, is
corrupted. This might allow a malicious adversary to broadcast
a much lower interference power, with a very low duty-
cycle, while still disrupting receiver operation. This form of
subtle interference, while disrupting the NMA service, might
not induce any obvious disruption to the tracking and navi-
gation functionality of the target receiver. Moreover, it might
even allow the adversary to go undetected, leaving the target
receiver unable to identify the cause of the authentication
failure, or unable to localize the adversary.
To explore this problem, this section considers a hypotheti-
cal Galileo E1-B NMA scheme as a case study. It is assumed
that the ‘Reserved 1’ field is used, which delivers 40 bits every
two seconds. An adversary is assumed to broadcast pulsed in-
terference, similar to that described in Sec. III, however rather
than randomly timed interference pulses, they are arranged to
maximize the disruption caused to the decoding of the NMA
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Fig. 10. Locations of 30 symbols that might be corrupted by an adversary
(top), and their locations after de-interleaving (bottom), for one even and odd
page of the Galileo E1-B message.
data. For simplicity it is assumed that one complete set of
cryptographic data is broadcast over 15 consecutive 40-bit
fields, offering one message authentication operation every 30-
seconds. To deny message authentication, an adversary might
attempt to corrupt one of these 40-bit portions. As a case study,
it is assumed that the adversary targets the first 40-bit block
of each 30-second period, denoted hereafter by u(1)NMA.
In the previous section, as both the thermal noise and
interference were assumed to be uncorrelated over time, the
block interleaving of the navigation message, u, has been
neglected, here, however, it becomes an important aspect.
Block interleaving is a process of re-arranging the codeword
symbols before broadcast, such that adjacent symbols are dis-
persed when broadcast. Once received, these symbols are de-
interleaved before decoding. Burst of errors, spanning multiple
symbols, during the signal transmission will appear as sparse
errors after the symbols are de-interleaved, which can be more
easily corrected by the coding scheme. Block interleaving can
be represented as filling a matrix column-wise with c, taking
it’s transpose, and extracting the data, again column-wise. For
Galileo E1-B a 30× 8 interleaving matrix is used.
When targeting a specific portion of the received navigation
message, it is in the adversarys interest to corrupt the symbols
which are related to these bits. For a 1/r-rate convolutional
encoder of constraint-length L, then the encoding of k con-
secutive bits will influence a total of r× (k + L) symbols (94
symbols for E1-B signal).
Once synchronized with a GNSS signal, a malicious ad-
versary may then broadcast interference at specific intervals
such that, once de-interleaved, a continuous portion of the
symbols related to u(1)NMA is corrupted, thereby maximizing the
likelihood of corrupting u(1)NMA. This is depicted in Fig. 10,
where every eighth symbol is corrupted for a total of 30
symbols.
When striving to maximize the likelihood of corrupting
u
(1)
NMA, or maximizing the corresponding authentication error
rate (AER), the adversary may adjust three variables: the
pulse duration; the instantaneous interference power; and the
number of symbols to corrupt. To negate the effectiveness of
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Fig. 11. AER versus instantaneous interference strength Es/ (N0 + J0/ρ),
using hard-decision Viterbi decoding, considering various numbers of symbol
corruptions as well as the continuous interference case.
pule-blanking, it is clear that the pulse duration should be
set equal to, and aligned with, the received symbols, such
that Np = 4096, as defined in Sec. III. The number of
symbols to corrupt should be as low as possible, while still
overwhelming the FEC decoder, so at least longer than the
constraint-length, and thus in the range: [8, 94]. The number of
symbols to corrupt effectively defines an average interference
duty-cycle, ρ, as defined in Sec. III, over the entire 30 second
authentication period. Note that in this case it takes on an
extremely small value: 0.0013 ≤ ρ ≤ 0.0125.
The influence of the instantaneous interference power, and
number of symbol corruptions on the AER is explored in
Fig. 11 for a hard-decision Viterbi decoder. As would be
expected, for a given instantaneous interference power, as
the number of symbols is increased, the AER increases. Is
can be seen that corrupting as few as 80 symbols, equivalent
to ρ = 0.01, yields an AER very close to the continuous
interference case. It seems that a calculated and synchronized
interference attack can achieve similar service disruption to
the continuous interference case, with approximately 1% of
the average power.
Further insight into this can be gained by rescaling Fig. 11
by the ρ, to present the AER as a function of average
interference power, as shown in Fig. 12. It is evident that
corrupting as few as 30 to 80 symbols offers a very efficient
means for an adversary to deny the NMA service. To provoke
an AER of 0.9 in the target receiver, then an adversary
might broadcast a synchronized corruption of 40 symbols,
requiring an average power approximately 20 dB lower than
if a continuous interference were used. In this case, the
target receiver observes an Es/N0 of approximately 16 dB,
or a C/N0 of 40 dBHz, which is not alarmingly low under
nominal conditions. Similarly, if an AER of 0.99 is to be
provoked, 60 symbols might be targeted, providing an average
interference power reduction of approximately 19 dB relative
to a continuous interference.
Fig. 13 depicts similar results for soft-decision Viterbi
decoding. In this case, the conservative assumption is made
that the receiver has a perfect estimate of the (N0 + J0/ρ)
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Fig. 12. AER versus average interference strength Es/ (N0 + J0) using
hard-decision Viterbi decoding, considering various numbers of symbol cor-
ruptions as well as the continuous interference case.
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Fig. 13. AER versus average interference strength Es/ (N0 + J0) using soft-
decision Viterbi decoding with perfect (N0 + J0/ρ) estimation, considering
various numbers of symbol corruptions as well as the continuous interference
case.
value for each symbol. As would be expected, the curves
are generally offset by approximately 2 dB, relative to the
hard-decision case. However, in this case, for fewer than 20
symbol corruptions, soft-decoding provides near perfect error
correction, and so the 10-symbol curve has been omitted.
Again, it appears that a margin of approximately 19 dB exists
between the continuous interference and the synchronized-
pulsed interference cases.
These results seem to expose a potential vulnerability of
a future NMA user, that an adversary might be capable of
disrupting normal receiver operation by broadcasting a GNSS-
synchronized interference with an extremely low average
power. As the duty-cycle is so low, and the pulses are so well
dispersed, it is also likely that this interference may not induce
a noticeable malfunction of any other receiver component. As
C/N0 estimation typically employs smoothing of one second
or longer [8], it is likely that it will be unaffected. Code and
carrier tracking systems will likely operate on the pilot signal
E1-C, and may use a coherent integration period of longer
than one-symbol. As the bandwidth of the tracking loops is
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relatively narrow, of the order of Hertz for the code and some
tens of Hertz for the carrier, it is likely that code and carrier
observations will provide no obvious indication either.
It is somewhat unfortunate, that the use of a block-
interleaver appears to work in favor of the adversary in this
particular case. If it were necessary to corrupt long runs of
adjacent symbols, it might be easier to become aware of
adversarial conditions. Nonetheless, it is clear that a receiver
which intends to exploit an NMA service should host some
form of sample-level monitoring system to detect such forms
of subtle-interference.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Modern GNSS signals employ a diverse selection of error-
correcting codes which provide robust data reception, not only
in the classical AWGN or fading channels, but also in the face
of an adversary who is broadcasting a malicious interference.
This article evidenced that this performance can be further
improved via receiver enhancements, such as soft-decision
decoding. Its implementation requires minimal receiver modi-
fications and can be embedded using the basic building blocks
of a GNSS receiver. Results show that a soft-decoding scheme
provides robustness to a generic type of pulsed jamming
interference, in contrast to hard-decoding approaches.
As the use of GNSS penetrates ever more in critical applica-
tions, the need for robust and reliable GNSS is growing. Since
the adoption of some signal-borne cryptographic schemes
seems to be a viable defense against counterfeit signals, the
availability of the navigation message is central to securing
GNSS. Results show that a well calibrated attack can readily
disrupt a naı¨ve navigation message authentication scheme. As
such, it is clear that these schemes should not only be robust in
a security sense, but also robust against noise and interference.
Unfortunately, although the improved receiver technology
can deliver substantial gains, such improved technology in the
hands of an adversary might be equally powerful. It is possible
that future GNSS signals may require even more powerful
encoding and that receivers may be required to adapt to the
threat of a more sophisticated adversary.
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